

THE EUROPEAN ARMIES BETWEEN THE WARS

1914 the powers of Europe had gone to war in high spirits, confident of victory and flushed by the anticipation of reaping the glories and benefits that traditionally have the spoils of war. The glamour of war, however, quickly lost its gloss, replaced by months and then years of unmitigated horror, and in the end the nations of Europe, like the soldiers they had sent into the meat grinder, emerged from the holocaust scarred psychologically as well as physically. The memories and the consequences of the Great War would cast a shadow over the next two decades, not only determining in large part the attitudes of each nation toward war, but also helping to mold the composition of their respective military forces.

THE SEARCH FOR STABILITY

The aftermath of the Great War saw Europe divided into two groups: those nations satisfied with the status quo and hence desiring stability in international relations, and those dissatisfied with their situation and therefore seeking to change the status quo. Given this state of affairs, the question of how long Europe would remain at peace depended upon two factors: the ability and willingness of the satisfied powers to keep the dissatisfied in line (either by persuasion or force); and the ability and determination of the disgruntled to improve their position.

In 1919 the victorious allies (Britain, France, the United States, and Italy) tried to assure stability by eliminating the war-making capability of Germany. Their instrument was to be the Treaty of Versailles. The heart of this document was Article 231, the infamous "war guilt" clause that labeled Germany the aggressor of 1914. Having been so branded, she was then burdened with the penalty for her crime. The provinces of Alsace and Lorraine were returned to France, which also received control over the lucrative Saar coal fields for fifteen years. German territory west of the Rhine River (the Rhineland) was to be a permanent demilitarized zone, thereby

denying Germany a foothold from which to attack France. Czechoslovakia received German territory, while Denmark regained part of Schleswig. Germany's overseas colonies were divided among Britain, France, the United States, and Japan who held them as "mandated territories" for the new League of Nations.

In addition to the loss of territory, Germany was forced to assume the total cost of the war to the victors, originally figured at \$32 billion plus interest. (The sum was eventually scaled down to \$9 billion plus \$1.7 billion in interest, most of which was never paid.) Finally, the victors limited Germany's military and naval forces. (See p. 8) Handicapped by these psychological and economic burdens, it was only logical that Germany would fall into the ranks of the dissatisfied nations or that Germans of all classes and political persuasions would seek to redress the humiliation of Versailles if the opportunity arose. Whether such an opportunity appeared would depend in part on the willingness of the victors to enforce the provisions of the Versailles Treaty.

In this sense, events did not augur well for the future peace and stability of Europe. The United States, whose President had insisted on including the League of Nations in the treaty, refused to sign the agreement and lapsed into her traditional policy of isolation. The League, intended by Woodrow Wilson to replace the discredited balance of power diplomacy by a true community of nations, soon proved a weak reed. The United States, Germany, and Bolshevik Russia were not even members. Moreover, the two key members, Great Britain and France, disagreed on the very purpose of the League — Britain viewing it as a convenient justification to reduce her unilateral commitment on the Continent, and France determined to use it to keep Germany subdued. Without agreement between the major powers, enforcement of League decisions was to prove impossible.

"The victor may have peace or he may have vengeance. but he cannot extract both from the same treaty."

Thomas A. Bailey

The farther East one looked, the more discouraging the situation appeared. Italy, outraged at the refusal of the other victors to grant all her demands along the Adriatic Sea, would, in 1922, become the first fascist state. The creation or recasting of thirteen states in Eastern and Southeastern Europe provided fertile soil for social, economic, and political instability. The mere existence of the Soviet Union with its threat to capitalist society would cast an unsettling shadow over Europe throughout the period. Finally, in the immediate postwar years each of the European states suffered from serious internal difficulties.

In spite of these portents of future trouble, by the middle of the 1920s international peace and prosperity were on the upswing. In the Locarno Agreement of 1925, the new German government — the Weimar Republic (named for the town where the constitution was signed) — accepted as permanent her western borders as established at Versailles and agreed to seek revision in the east only through peaceful negotiations. In return, Germany was granted admission to the League with a permanent seat on the governing council. By 1930, having signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact, twenty-eight nations had formally renounced the use of force in international relations.

Events in the next decade, however, demonstrated the fragile foundations upon which this stability had been built. The economic prosperity that made possible domestic tranquility and international goodwill depended upon massive American loans to Europe. When the American economy collapsed in 1929, the shock waves reverberated across the Atlantic. The Great Depression released economic, social, and political tensions lying just below the

surface. As governments struggled to cope with these problems within their own national boundaries, a narrow sense of nationalism replaced the cooperative attitude characterized by the "Spirit of Locarno." The structure of inter national goodwill and stability cracked and then crumbled under the strain.

In 1931, Japan took what would prove the first step down the road to global war by invading Manchuria. When the League condemned Japan for its aggression but refused either to impose economic sanctions or threaten the use of force, other would-be aggressors concluded that the League had little bite to support even its limited bark. Two years later Germany, with Adolf Hitler at its head, withdrew from both the European disarmament conference that had convened the year before and from the League itself. The following year, while Nazi extremists failed an attempted revolution in Austria, Japan unilaterally renounced the naval treaties of 1922 and 1930 (see Chapter 18) and initiated a major naval building program. In 1936 Fascist Italy invaded Ethiopia, as Benito Mussolini sought to revive the glory of the Roman Empire. While the League did invoke sanctions this time, these did not include the vital oil and petroleum which had become the lifeblood of modern armies. Despite the dignified plea of Emperor Haile Selassie for League support, Ethiopia became an Italian colony the next year.

Meanwhile, Germany had taken the first overt steps to break the bonds imposed by her former enemies. In March 1935 Hitler — now the Führer of the Third German Reich — repudiated the Treaty of Versailles, publicly announced the introduction of conscription and revealed the existence of the new German air force, the *Luftwaffe*. A year later, the Führer sent German troops marching into the Rhineland. The occupation and subsequent fortification of the Rhineland was a pivotal event in the interwar period. The democracies' failure to act reinforced Hitler's conviction that they would not fight so long as he avoided a direct confrontation.

Elimination of the demilitarized buffer zone upon which France had depended for her security and fortification of the Rhineland provided a strong defensive position for Germany if Hitler chose to turn his attention to the east.

Why did the European democracies not take strong steps to prevent or halt aggression in the 1930s? In both Britain and France the willingness and the ability to act were hampered by domestic instability, by interpretations of the experiences in the Great War, and by the overwhelming desire to avoid conflict at all costs. Together, these considerations affected both the willingness to use force and the very nature of the military services of the democracies.

FRANCE: MAGINOT MENTALITY

In 1919 France seemed once again the dominant power on the European continent. She had borne a great burden in the struggle against Germany; she had regained the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine and thereby revenged the humiliation of 1871; and her premier, Georges Clemenceau, in many ways dominated the councils of the Big Four meeting in Paris to hammer out the peace. Yet appearances were illusory, for the Great War had damaged France in ways that victory could not repair, especially victory obtained at such staggering cost.

France emerged from the conflict of 1914-1918 exhausted materially and, even more, psychologically. The war had drained the nation of its inner strength. Except for a brief period from 1925 to 1931, the next two decades were years of financial imbalance, social antagonism, and political disorder. Unable to maintain stability at home, France would prove unable to foster stability in international relations. With the onset of the depression, France entered a period of perpetual crisis. The life expectancy of French governments in the 1930s was more often measured in months than years, with the political pendulum swinging erratically between left and right. Its people divided among themselves, its social and economic

structure crumbling, and its political system unable to provide direction and cohesion, France appeared to be coming apart at the seams by the middle of the 1930s.

On only one thing did almost all Frenchmen agree: whatever the cost, France must avoid a repetition of 1914-1918. The memory of the Great War weighed like an albatross upon France and determined not only foreign policy but military organization and doctrine as well. "Never again" had become the guiding principle. To this end France sought to use the League to dominate Germany and, when Britain objected, turned to a series of defensive alliances with the new Eastern European nations to surround her arch-enemy. Unfortunately, there existed a basic dichotomy between French foreign and military policies. For while her objective of hemming in Germany required an offensive capability, the military instrument at her disposal was completely defensive.

The French Army

If it is true that "those who ignore the past are condemned to repeat it," it is equally correct that those who rely *too* narrowly on past experiences tend to be out of step with the present and unable to catch up to the future. Nowhere is this more clearly illustrated than in the organization and doctrine of the French military after the First World War.

In the course of four years of stalemated trench warfare, French military theory reversed itself completely.¹ By 1918, the emphasis on *élan* and *esprit de corps* had been replaced by reliance on mass armies and the organized nation-in-arms. War had become a matter of attrition in which weight of numbers and material resources rather than moral superiority and professional skill would prevail. Thus, French theory now stressed the mobilization of all elements within the nation, including human resources, economic potential, and spiritual and moral values. The organization of the army reflected this change, as did the doctrine for its employment. A massive reserve system, provided for by conscription and short term enlistments, overshadowed

the small regular cadre, whose primary purpose was no longer to conduct offensive operations (*a la* "on to Berlin") but to act as a covering force behind which the nation could mobilize. The very concept of the brash offensive embodied in the old Plan XVII was rejected. Instead of rushing headlong into the slaughter, French forces would sit back and allow the enemy to bleed *itself* white. The army of Napoleon and of Foch, of the *offensive a outrance* and of reckless bravery, had repudiated its traditions.

"Morale alone can accomplish nothing. On the contrary, it is confidence in machines which fortifies and strengthens morale."

Colonel Julien Brosse

The epitome of this commitment to the defensive was the Maginot Line, begun under the direction of War Minister Andre Maginot in 1929 and completed in 1934. A complex maze of heavily armored and camouflaged gun positions sustained by labyrinths of underground facilities, with antitank obstacles breaking the terrain, the Maginot Line was to be the Great Wall of France, against which the German army would be decimated while behind it the French nation marshalled its manpower and resources. From the Swiss Alps to the Belgian border, the Maginot Line reflected in steel and concrete not only the deep aversion in France toward offensive operations but also the incongruity between the desire to play a major role in Europe and the single-minded determination to avoid war. "When we have lavished so much effort on building a fortified barrier," the war minister asked rhetorically in 1935, "who would believe us foolish enough to sally out in front of this barrier, in search of who knows what adventure."²

Nor was this defensive mentality imposed

upon an unwilling military. If Ferdinand Foch had been the spokesman for the pre-war army, Henri Philippe Petain, the man who early in his career had been passed over for promotion for advocating the superiority of the defensive, dominated it after the war. For the generation of French leaders who had experienced the Western Front, the Great War had proved conclusively the supremacy of the defensive. The task of the high command was now to assure that the army was organized, equipped, and deployed in accordance with this fundamental truth. Rejecting the glorification of the offensive based on moral superiority, army leaders now argued precisely the opposite. "Morale alone can accomplish nothing," wrote one member of the general staff. "On the contrary, it is confidence in machines which fortifies and strengthens morale."³ Having rejected one doctrinaire approach, they became equally dogmatic in another direction.

The most striking characteristic of the French high command was an extreme close-mindedness that went far beyond merely a lack of imagination and that resulted in a "concept of the defensive [that] amounted to nothing more than complete passivity, rendered even more inadequate by ill-considered tactics." In 1935, for example, the commanding general declared that only the high command was qualified to discuss military doctrine and officers should refrain from questioning official doctrine either publicly or privately."⁴[i] When Colonel Charles de Gaulle argued for an elite, mechanized force in place of a static mass army, his name was removed from the promotion lists, the same fate Petain had suffered years before.

The best example of this reactionary attitude was the high command's position on the development and employment of armored forces. Immediately after the war, General Estienne, creator of the French Tank Corps,

[i] The situation was not much better across the channel where the chief of the Imperial General Staff once remarked, "On principle I consider that no officer on the active list should be permitted to publish any book on a military subject" (Liddel Hart, *The Tanks*, pp 224-225)

argued in favor of using tanks supported by air power to conduct offensive operations.⁵ Under Petain, however, the Tank Corps itself was disbanded and the influence of tankers (as well as airmen) reduced to zero in the determination of army doctrine and equipment. Infantry remained the queen of battle. In 1930, the official manual for the employment of tanks stated, "Tanks are only supplementary means, temporarily at the disposal of the infantry ... whose progress is alone decisive." At a time when the German Army was experimenting with independent, mechanized forces, the chief of the French Army declared, "There is no possibility that a mechanized combat detachment can ever be used to lead a complete operation by itself..."⁶[ii]

Although the French government initiated a rearmament program in 1937, intellectual deficiencies within the military combined with domestic problems to render these efforts ineffective. The weakness of political leadership, the universal desire to avoid war, and the chaotic conditions in French industry made rearmament a painfully slow process. Even more detrimental to French security were weaknesses within the French military. When the German onslaught swept through France in the summer of 1940, the defenders possessed more tanks and guns and almost as many airplanes as the attackers. However, French tanks were either too light (scout vehicles) or too heavy and cumbersome (infantry support weapons); they were incorrectly dispersed among infantry units rather than being grouped into armored brigades or divisions; and an air support capability scarcely existed. Most significant, the French high command, psychologically committed to and trained for a plodding defensive war, was unable to adjust to the speed, maneuverability, and shock tactics of the German panzer forces.⁷

On the battlefield and on the home front,

the fall of France would represent a moral and psychological collapse more than a physical defeat. The abrupt demise of the Third Republic would be only the outward manifestation of a malaise that had not only weakened the army but had eroded both the political system and the very underpinnings of French society.

GREAT BRITAIN: LIMITED LIABILITY

Great Britain suffered from many of the same troubles as her ally on the Continent.

Economically, the English had great difficulty recuperating from the disruption of the war, having lost much of their international trade and investments to the United States. Repayment of the war loans she had received from the United States government and from American businesses put an additional strain on her financial resources. While Britain avoided the chaos that characterized French politics, by and large political leadership proved incapable of meeting the challenges of the new age.

There were, however, significant, if somewhat intangible, differences between the two countries. British society did not suffer from the open class hostilities that contributed so much to the lack of social cohesion in France; also, neither communism nor fascism ever gained much headway. Moreover, the sense of national exhaustion that hung over France was absent.

In foreign policy, most Englishmen agreed they had had their fill of continental involvement. Remembering the horrors of trench warfare and forgetting they had gone to war for valid reasons, the British government, people, and armed forces were determined not to make that mistake again. As in France, "the public lost all interest in the problems of war and was distinguished

[ii] The primary tactical mission of the French air force was reconnaissance, not close support. While accepting the principle of a strategic air arm, the French government never allocated sufficient funds, energy or attention to convert that principle into reality

by its passionate desire for peace.⁸ Unlike France, however, this revulsion toward war developed into a specific anti-military attitude that had a direct impact on the status and capability of the British military forces.

The British Army

The closer ties to society created by the Haldane reforms and the Great War proved to be only a brief interlude in the history of British civil-military relations.⁹ No sooner had the war ended than the Army was again consigned to the wilderness, where for almost twenty years the passionate desire for peace, the lack of strong civilian and military leadership, and economic hardship caused it to exist in limbo.

One major problem the Army faced was the dearth of funds allocated to national defense. Far more than in France, British military forces suffered from tight budgets. The annual passage of the "Ten Year Ruse" — in which the government stated that no major war could be foreseen over the next ten years — justified in the eyes of politicians and population alike the neglect

of national defense. After World War I, moreover, the British Army had another cross to bear besides the traditional one of being ignored in the absence of a visible threat. The existence of the Royal Air Force (RAF), about whose deterrent and offensive capabilities advocates were making fantastic claims, bumped the Army from a poor second (behind the traditional line of defense, the Navy) to a forgotten third in the defense establishment.

Compounding this "poor relation" status was the absence of a perceived major role for ground forces. With the nation determined not to embark on another continental adventure, the Army was relegated to its traditional role of colonial *gendarmerie*. British defense policy reverted to the traditional one of focusing on control of the seas while relying on allies to fight land battles on the Continent. In 1937 Basil H. Liddell Hart, advisor to the Secretary of State for War, referred to this approach as "Limited Liability." In the event of war, Liddell Hart explained, Britain should not commit a mass army, but should engage in

"What drove our armies to disaster was the cumulative effect of a great number of different mistakes. One glaring characteristic is, however, common to all of them. Our leaders were incapable of thinking in terms of a new war. In other words, the German triumph was, essentially, a triumph of intellect...

"The ruling idea of the Germans in the conduct of this war was speed. We, on the other hand, did our thinking in terms of yesterday or the day before. Worse still: faced by the undisputed evidence of Germany's new tactics, we ignored, or wholly failed to understand, the quickened rhythm of the times ... Our own rate of progress was too slow and our minds were too inelastic for us ever to admit the possibility that the enemy might move with the speed which he actually achieved. So true is this, that it was as though the two opposed forces belonged, each of them, to an entirely different period of human history ... From the beginning to the end of the war, the metronome at headquarters was always set at too slow a beat."

Marc Bloch, referring to the French defeat during the German blitzkrieg in the summer of 1940. Bloch, a world renowned historian, was a veteran of the Great War and a reserve officer who reentered active duty in 1939 at the age of 53. He was killed by the Nazis in 1944 for his participation in the French Resistance. *Strange Defeat*, pp. 36-37, 43-45.

hit-and-run amphibious operations that would take advantage of her ability to operate around the periphery of the Continent. While such operations, in conjunction with the activities of whatever allies existed, distracted and tied down the enemy's land forces, air power would deal the decisive blow to the enemy's homeland.¹⁰

Unfortunately, interservice rivalry made a mockery of such grandiose theories. The key to a doctrine of limited liability was the ability to plan and conduct joint operations; but, while amphibious operations are perhaps the most difficult of all military maneuvers, not a single joint training exercise took place throughout this period. The near-total lack of cooperation, coordination, and joint planning among the three services reflected the lack of direction from civilian leadership, who wanted primarily to forget about the armed forces.

Over and above these external obstacles, the British Army suffered from a conservative high command. As in France, this attitude was best revealed in the Army's official perceptions of the organization and use of mechanized forces. In this instance, the tragedy was not merely that so little was done in the area of mechanized war, but that the potential was so great something *might* have been done. Both the machine and the doctrine for a new type of war had their origins in the British Army during World War I; yet the British Expeditionary Force that landed in France in 1939 lacked a single armored division. (See Chapter 21 for discussion of early developments in tank warfare.) Those who advocated a new style of war based on the internal combustion engine found their ideas stifled by the factors that hampered the British Army as a whole: the shortage of funds, the absence of a clear strategic purpose, and the burden of a conservative leadership.

Ironically, the British Army had been one of the first to undertake serious experiments

with mechanized forces. The establishment of the "Experimental Force" in 1927, and public remarks by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), seemed to indicate significant developments would be forthcoming. However, inter-branch rivalry and financial limitations nipped these developments in the bud. When the commander of the mechanized force sought permission to conduct deep penetration experiments in the annual exercises of 1934, conservative elements stacked the deck and thereby "proved" armored units could not operate independent of infantry and artillery.¹¹

"What are the qualities of the good soldier? ... The following four — in whatever order you place them — pretty well cover the field: discipline, physical fitness, technical skill in the use of his weapons, battle-craft."

Sir A. P. Wavell

The onset of the depression coincided with changes in the high command to stifle mechanized developments almost completely. Asked if he had read a new book by General J. F. C. Fuller, a leading advocate of tank warfare, the new CIGS replied, "I have not read Fuller's book! And I don't suppose I ever shall. It would only annoy me."¹² Given this attitude, it is not surprising that Army doctrine envisaged only a limited tactical role for armor in support of infantry operations. According to the first British armor manual (1927), tanks were "particularly suited for undertaking tasks with a limited objective within the main plan ..." but could not be employed against distant objectives because of their vulnerability to artillery and their lack of communication.¹³ Nor did most military men foresee extensive air-ground cooperation for offensive action. The RAF, wedded to the concept of strategic bombing, opposed a close air support role, and the

Army made little effort to obtain such support. Both services agreed air power's tactical role was limited to reconnaissance.

Reinforcing official doctrine were financial limitations and the uncertainties posed by the absence of a clear national policy on the employment of military forces. With the coming of the depression, military budgets, already skimpy, were reduced even further; and in all fairness to those responsible for the Army, there simply was not enough money to go around. To make matters worse, civilian authorities, reluctant even to discuss defense matters, failed to establish a clear policy to guide military leaders. While the idea of "Limited Liability" was bandied about freely, Army officers knew that their country had diplomatic obligations in Europe. Moreover, past experience reminded them that the government *could* change its mind, as it had done in 1914.

The dilemma the Army faced is that the possible missions required different types of forces; a mechanised force, perhaps useful on the Continent, surely would be of limited value for colonial police operations. As one officer observed, tanks might be good on Salisbury Plain or in the fields of Flanders, "but it is not necessarily the most-powerful [weapon] in the North-West Frontier [of India], or in the swamps and ditches that surround the suburbs of Shanghai."¹⁴ Lacking specific guidance, the Army was reluctant to commit the limited resources available for fear of arming for the wrong war. As a result, military officials concentrated on experimentation rather than on standardization and the production of a few basic mechanized systems (as Germany and the Soviet Union would do). Unfortunately, this meant insufficient tanks on hand even to conduct meaningful experimental maneuvers, let alone to fight if war came. Well into the 1930s, "the British Army was a display case full of samples commanded by men who were not at all sure how these things should be used, if employed at all."¹⁵

The British Army would be less ready for war in 1939 than in 1914. On the earlier occasion, the military had just completed ten years of serious study and reform as a result of the Boer War. In the later years, financial constraints, political uncertainty, and narrow-minded complacency hindered not only organization but doctrinal development as well.¹⁶

GERMANY: LIGHTNING WAR

While the western democracies proved unwilling to enforce the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was even less inclined to accept its impositions. Unconvinced that they really had been defeated in the war, most Germans were determined to regain their nation's place in the sun.

Germany had ended the war in chaos. Frustration over the economic crisis resulting from the Entente blockade and anger over political and social inequities had toppled the monarchy. For more than four years after the armistice, the provisional socialist government and later the Weimar Republic faced serious threats from radical groups of both the right and the left. In the disorder of the immediate post-war struggle, the basic pattern of civil-military relations was established for the next decade.

The provisional government, composed primarily of moderate Social Democrats, turned to the army to save the state from further revolution. In return for a promise to prevent radical change within the military structure, senior army officials agreed to support the provisional government. This decision arose not from a sense of loyalty to the government but because the army by 1918 viewed itself as the protector and final arbiter of the "German nation," a concept larger than any particular government.

With the establishment of the duly-elected Weimar Republic, this relationship between the army and the government continued. Ideologically opposed to the Social

Democrats, who they believed had stabbed the army in the back by accepting the armistice in November 1918, military leaders continued to work with the government when they believed this to be in the army's — and hence the nation's — best interests. Rigidly apolitical as individuals, the *Reichsheer* (the German Army) *as an institution* became heavily involved in politics.

The establishment of the Weimar Republic in 1919 did not end the chaotic situation within Germany. For four years violence continued, as both conservative and radical elements sought to overthrow the government. Adding to the disruption was a traumatic economic crisis in which the unemployment numbered in the millions and inflation made the *Deutschmark* absolutely worthless. In 1924, however, the situation improved, although social tensions still smouldered just below the surface and there was little real loyalty to the government. The easing of tension between Germany and France, the establishment of a set reparations schedule, and the appearance of several strong political leaders led to better international relations and domestic stability. For half a decade, Germany experienced a boom economy and political stability.

The prosperity and peace that settled over Germany after 1924, however, proved to be a mere facade that crumbled in the face of renewed economic pressures. Lacking a solid base of support, the Weimar government was unable to resolve the economic problems that came with the depression in the next decade. Political violence again erupted as radical groups at both ends of the ideological spectrum attacked the weak center, vied for support at the polls, and fought openly in the streets. In the middle of this confusion, the leader of a small right-wing fringe group saw his opportunity. As the head of the Nazi Party in 1924, Adolf Hitler had attempted an abortive coup in Munich and had spent nine months in prison. When he was released, the outlook for his party seemed slim. In the 1928 elections, the Nazis polled only

820,000 votes (2.6 percent of the total). But the depression and the threat of communist revolution provided the perfect environment. Playing on both the Red threat and the Versailles humiliation, Hitler employed propaganda and violence to further his cause. In the elections of 1932, the Nazis captured 37 percent of the vote and became the largest party in the *Reichstag* (*Parliament*).

After a series of rapid turnovers of government between 1930 and 1933, former Field Marshal, now President, Paul von Hindenburg, reluctantly named the ex-corporal Chancellor of the German Republic. The unsuccessful *putsch* leader had taken control of the government legally; and one of the key groups supporting him in this drive had been the *Reichsheer*.

The German Army and the Weimar Republic

The German military had been dealt a heavy blow by the Treaty of Versailles, many of whose restrictions were aimed specifically at ending the military power that had cost so much to defeat. The Army was reduced to a total strength of 100,000 officers and men, serving long-term commitments since conscription was forbidden. The General Staff was abolished and replaced by a truncated administrative agency, the *Truppenamt*. The German High Seas Fleet was limited to a force of six small warships and some coastal craft, while the air force was dismantled completely. The manufacture of military equipment was severely limited, with no tanks, airplanes and submarines allowed; and most of the equipment on hand was to be turned over to an Allied Control Commission.

Hardly had the ink dried on the parchment, however, when the German military — with the connivance of the civilian government — began to subvert these restrictions. The key individual in these actions, and the most important German

HANS VON SEECKT, Generaloberst, German Wehrmacht, 1886-1936

Hans von Seeckt was a Prussian soldier of the old school. His cold, aloof personality and single-minded dedication to his profession earned him the respect of his peers and the soubriquet, "The Sphinx." During World War I, he gained lasting fame as chief of staff to the dashing Field Marshal von Mackensen. As the saying went: "Where there is Mackensen, there is Seeckt; where there is Seeckt, there is victory." His experience with mobile warfare in the East convinced him to make it the strategic and tactical cornerstone of the new post-war German Army. As commander of the Reichswehr, von Seeckt preserved the General Staff and fashioned a generation of officers in his image — the "mould of Seeckt." The small Reichswehr officer corps was, in fact, an elite force of leaders and instructors who were characterized by technical expertise and tactical brilliance. In 1926, when Seeckt surrendered his post, he left behind the framework for future rapid military expansion.

He also left behind an officer corps of uncertain political loyalites. If the "mould of Seeckt" required officers of the highest professional competence, it also demanded officers who would remain "non-political." In effect, Reichswehr officers became military specialists whose attitude of professional detachment discouraged attempts to restrain wayward politicians. In the 1920s when sharp definitions of loyalty and honor became blurred and confusing, the seeds of future tragedy were sown. During the Nazi era, the Seeckt-moulded professional officer did his duty effectively, but frequently washed his hands of all responsibility for the orders he executed.

More than any other individual, Hans von Seeckt was responsible for the future Wehrmacht officer distinguished by military efficiency, political naiveté, and moral relativism.

Major David Spires, DFH

Best Book: B.H. Liddell Hart, *The German Generals Talk*

military officer of the period, was Hans von Seeckt, head of the Army from 1919 to 1926.¹⁷ A highly successful field army chief of staff in World War I, Seeckt took over as head of the *Truppenamt* in 1919; his objective — to maintain the unity of the Army and to prepare for the time when Germany would be in a position to throw off the yoke of Versailles.

According to Seeckt, the purpose of the *Reichsheer* was twofold: to provide for the security of Germany and to act as the foundation for an expanded army in the future. An extremely rigorous selection and training process produced a cadre of men each capable of performing responsibilities several levels above his current position. To provide reserve manpower, police forces

were overmanned and were equipped and trained by military officers, as were various paramilitary organizations established throughout Germany. Nor was the air arm neglected. A state-supported airline, *Lufthansa*, was established with military as well as civilian considerations in mind. Army funds were secretly funneled to glider clubs and private "sport flying" clubs to train pilots and keep them current, while research, development and production planning continued both within Germany itself and at German industrial facilities in other countries. Particularly useful was the arrangement between the *Reichsheer* and the Soviet Army whereby the latter provided facilities in Russia for the development, testing, and training of military equipment,

including tanks and aircraft; in return the Red Army received the benefit of the Reichsheer's considerable knowledge as well as the results of this experimentation. Finally, Seeckt kept the General Staff alive by parceling out its functions to various army organizations and to agencies outside the military.

In the development of doctrine the restrictions of Versailles worked in Germany's favor. Unable to count on overwhelming their enemies by weight of numbers, and prevented from building fortifications, German military thinkers were forced to look for alternatives to mass frontal assaults or static defenses. During the war, the Germans had been the first to break away from suicidal frontal assaults with the development of tactics employing flexibility, small unit infiltration to bypass enemy strong points, and the reinforcement of success rather than failure. Under Seeckt's guidance the search for alternatives to the straightforward "over the top" approach continued as the German Army focused on mobility, maneuver, and flexibility to outthink rather than outslug the enemy. In place of the mass armies of the last conflict, Seeckt envisaged success in future war as lying "in the employment of mobile armies, relatively small but of high quality, and rendered more effective by the addition of aircraft ..."¹⁸ More than his subversion of the Versailles prohibitions, Seeckt's legacy to the German Army was "a gospel of mobility, based on the view that a quick-moving, quick-hitting army of picked troops could, under modern conditions, make rings around an old-fashioned mass army."¹⁹

In the process of developing this force, he encouraged his subordinates to maintain an open mind toward all potential military developments.²⁰ It was this cast of mind, with its emphasis on flexibility and open-mindedness, that would most distinguish the German Army from its counterparts in

Britain or France as Europe approached the Second World War. Whereas Britain had fallen back on "Limited Liability," and France had dug in with a "Maginot Line Mentality," the German military had begun to think in terms of "Lightning War."

In spite of the work of Seeckt and others, the renewed intellectual vigor, and the subversion of the treaty provisions, the German Army remained a weak military force. It was the recognition of this weakness that caused army leaders, reluctantly, to support Adolf Hitler.

The Army and the Nazi Party

Few of the German high command looked with pleasure on the rise of this vulgar upstart. Yet their interpretation of the best interests of the nation and the Army led them to support his claim to the chancellorship and to acquiesce in his complete takeover of the government. Unable to handle revolution from both left and right, they opted for Hitler and against the Communists. Making this decision more palatable were Hitler's promises to rebuild the military, to end the Versailles humiliation, and to return Germany to the position she merited. Finally, many in the high command believed they could use Hitler for their own purposes and then discard him.²¹

Between 1933 and 1938 Hitler ostensibly allowed the high command a free hand to conduct its own affairs. Yet in these years the Army exchanged the substance of power for the trappings of such.²² With the creation of the *Luftwaffe* under the command of Hitler's lieutenant Hermann Goering, the Army lost its special status as *the* military force in Germany. Moreover, the military as a whole now competed with both the Nazi Party and the government bureaucracy for political influence and material resources. Internally, the Army was nearly swamped by the rapid influx of men and materiel that followed Hitler's renunciation of the

Versailles Treaty, the reinstatement of conscription, and the subsequent buildup of armament production. Their attention concentrated on molding this enlarged force, Army leaders had little inclination or opportunity to analyze what was happening within Germany. In 1934 General Blomberg, Minister of Defense, voluntarily announced that the Army would wear the Nazi eagle-swastika insignia on its uniforms. More importantly, he agreed to have the Army swear allegiance to Hitler personally as Führer rather than to the government of Germany. The psychological impact of the oath was tremendous; from this point on, opposition to Hitler would no longer be a struggle with an unscrupulous partner, but a conspiracy against legitimate authority.²³

The relationship between the Führer and the generals began to change in 1936. The latter strongly opposed Hitler's intention to march into the demilitarized Rhineland, for they were convinced the western democracies would surely act and they knew Germany was not ready for war. When Britain and France failed to oppose this flagrant violation of the treaty, Hitler's prestige soared and his hold over the Army tightened. The process was essentially completed in February 1938 when the Army acquiesced as Hitler forced the minister of defense and the commander-in-chief of the Army to resign and declared himself commander-in-chief of the *Wehrmacht* (the armed forces as a whole). The army that had once been "a state within a state" and recently had been the decisive voice in Germany had become another tool for Adolf Hitler.

Yet while the military lost ground in the political arena, its military excellence continued. The tradition established by Seeckt had continued and the army remained receptive to new ideas, new technology, and new methods of war. The focus remained on mobility and quality rather than mass. As

early as 1921, maneuvers had been conducted with motorized units, and in 1923 and 1924 the Army conducted experiments in air-ground cooperation. Long before the creation of the *Luftwaffe*, former flying officers were assigned to commanders to provide advice and guidance on the effect of air power on ground operations. Not that the high command jumped immediately to support every new theory that surfaced. For example, Heinz Guderian met resistance to his ideas on the organization and employment of mechanized forces in the early 1930s. The difference between the German Army and others was that proponents of new ideas were at least provided with the resources to conduct experiments, while their counterparts elsewhere were more often squelched than supported.²⁴

Equally important, Hitler himself took a personal interest in things military, from strategy to technology, and was particularly receptive to ideas that would provide him with the capability to conduct the short, rapid campaigns his overall political strategy required. For Hitler had no intention of fighting exhausting wars of attrition. He hoped, first, to bluff his opponents with a show of force. If this failed, he wanted victory as quickly as possible to limit the disruptive effects of war and to capture intact as many of the enemy's resources as possible. The Führer knew that Germany would be at a disadvantage in a long war. Although economic and political considerations prevented the mechanization of more than a small percentage of the *Wehrmacht*, pitted against the traditional armies and outmoded doctrines of its early opponents even this "cutting edge" would be sufficient to make Germany supreme on the European continent.

THE SOVIET UNION: POLITICS OVER PROFESSIONALISM

In the two decades after the Great War, Soviet Russia existed on the fringe of Europe. Despite eventual diplomatic recognition by

the other nations, Russia remained an outcast. The fear of Bolshevism and world revolution served to keep most other nations at arm's length. As late as 1939 the western democracies' reluctance to align with the Communist state allowed Adolf Hitler the opportunity to neutralize the Soviet Union and thereby gain a free hand to invade Poland.

Of the major powers involved in World War I, Russia underwent the most turmoil and suffered the greatest consequences. In 1917, reaction to the conduct of the war resulted in the overthrow of the Tsar and his replacement by a provisional socialist government, which in turn was toppled by the Bolsheviks under Lenin. Lenin ended the war against the Central Powers by accepting the humiliating Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. At home, however, the country degenerated into a fierce civil war lasting almost four years. Out of this brutal domestic struggle emerged the Red Army. Under the iron hand of Leon Trotsky, the Red Army absorbed many of the marauding bands that had sprung up throughout Russia, reestablishing discipline and military order in the revolutionary ranks, and incorporating ideas and experiences that influenced the Soviet military for several decades.

In contrast to the static trench warfare of the World War, the civil war was one of offensives over vast territories, with sweeping cavalry raids, extensive use of railroads, and an emphasis on maneuver rather than attrition. Initially composed largely of peasants and former enlisted soldiers, at Trotsky's insistence the revolutionary army absorbed almost 50,000 officers and 250,000 noncommissioned officers of the old imperial army. At the same time, the conflict provided opportunities for natural leaders to rise through the ranks as fast as their abilities would carry them. Thus, when the war ended, the officer corps would consist of two types of officers—those with formal military training and

those who had gained their education in the heat of battle. To oversee the officer corps, especially the "military specialists" incorporated from the old Tsarist army, the position of political commissar was created. Attached to each military unit assure the commander's political reliability and to indoctrinate the troops with the proper revolutionary spirit, the commissars became half of a dual command system, jointly responsible with the commander for the conduct of the unit. This arrangement underscored the fundamental characteristic of the Red Army: from its inception, it was an avowedly *political* instrument in which the approved ideological position was often more important than professional capability.

Out of the civil war, then, came three characteristics that would remain part of the Soviet military system throughout the interwar period: a concentration on ground forces, with an emphasis on offensive operations; the presence within the officer corps of individuals who owed their positions to their own knowledge and abilities rather than political contacts (including a large number of "military specialists" who would remain suspect); and a dual command system that pitted military commander against political commissar.

Following the civil war and an unsuccessful invasion of Poland in 1920, the Red Army confronted two general problems armies have always faced: its relation to the state and society, and doctrinal issues dealing with the orientation, equipment, and employment of military forces. Throughout most of this period, the Red Army hierarchy engaged in spirited debate over certain key doctrinal issues: (1) the nature of future war; (2) the relative advantages of offense and defense; (3) whether to rely on a mass army or to develop an elite professional force; and (4) the question of the dominance of one branch or weapons system.²⁵ On all of these military issues, ideological considerations influenced the final decisions.

Virtually all Soviet military writers agreed the next war would consist of a prolonged struggle rather than a short, Napoleonic campaign. Because future conflicts would involve the resources of the entire nation, the Soviets placed a great deal of emphasis on the mobilization of all the state's resources and on the relationship between military planning and operations and economic and social developments. The most obvious example of this was the first Five Year Plan with its objective of creating a heavy industrial base for Russia's general economic development, but specifically for the improvement of her war-making capabilities.

Disagreement among Soviet officials arose over the question of emphasizing the relative advantages of offensive or defensive strategy. Those officers who had won their spurs as battlefield commanders in the civil war tended to favor bold offensive operations reminiscent of the cavalry raids they had employed in that conflict. Those with more conventional experience and training emphasized the superiority of the defense and argued that the "abnormal" conditions that had permitted unorthodox operations were not likely to prevail again. Officially, Soviet doctrine emphasized the value of maintaining the initiative through maneuver and offensive operations and warned against the development of a defensive mentality. Acknowledging that circumstances might make it necessary to assume the defensive for a time, it stressed that only offensive operations could secure a decisive victory over the enemy. At the same time, viewing war as a result of

capitalist competition, Soviet doctrine argued that Russia should be the last power to enter and then only when the capitalist states had exhausted themselves and intervention would result in the victory of the proletariat.

Ideology as well as the realities of Russian economic dislocation and technological backwardness dictated the composition of the Soviet Army. Since the Soviet Union was now a people's republic, military service was a universal responsibility. In the war against capitalism, mass would be one advantage on the side of the proletariat. Moreover, until the mid-1930s, the Soviet economy and educational level precluded a machine-intensive military structure. The manpower losses and economic disruption resulting from the revolution and the civil war, however, made a large standing force on the order of the wartime army impossible. As a result, until 1935 the Soviet Army consisted of a cadre force of about 500,000 troops, with primary responsibility for border defense, supported by a territorial militia distributed throughout the country. In addition, the Party organized numerous paramilitary organizations.

Tactically, the Soviets carried out progressive experiments in several areas. They were the first to conduct paratroop operations (in 1931) and several years later transported an entire rifle division by air the length of the Soviet Union. Their first mechanized brigade was created in 1930; three years later the Red Army possessed 3,000 tanks and "had already outstripped the West in terms of mechanisation."²⁶ By mid-decade, the Soviet military was developing two forces: one centered on mechanized and motorized units, the other consisting of masses of infantry and supporting elements. In keeping with the rejection of the concept of an elite force, however, Soviet doctrine stressed combined operations, with emphasis on infantry, supported by tanks, artillery, and aircraft.²⁷ Tactical as well as strategic combat doctrine

"The commander must try, above all, to establish personal and comradely contact with his men, but without giving away an inch of his authority."
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

GEORGI ZHUKOV, Marshal of the Soviet Union, 1896-1974

Mobilized into the czarist army in 1916, Sergeant Zhukov became a communist and a member of the revolutionary Red Army in 1918. In the 1930s Colonel, then General, Zhukov was one of the leading advocates of mechanized warfare. Between 1941 and 1943 he was "Stalin's fireman," commanding Russian forces in the battles of Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk. When the Red Army assumed the offensive, he led the forces which captured Berlin in May 1945.

As a commander, Zhukov was thorough, ruthless, and competent. Because of the lack of education and training in the Red Army, he depended on overwhelming superiority and detailed preparations rather than maneuver and intricate tactics. German opponents rated him the best of the Russian generals for his ability to coordinate the movements of large forces of combined arms. He was relentless in pressing an attack, and subordinate commanders were dismissed, or worse, if they failed to achieve their objectives. Regarding human life as an expendable resource, Zhukov once told Eisenhower that when the Red Army encountered mine fields, he simply marched his troops through them, since the losses so incurred were no higher than if the enemy had chosen to defend the position and considerable time was gained.

Indispensable during the war, he was one of the few men who dared openly to disagree with Stalin. In 1946 the latter "exiled" him to remote posts. Upon the death of Stalin in 1953, Zhukov became Minister of Defense and the first military member of the Praesidium. In 1957 he was relieved on charges of seeking to remove the army from political control. A "Hero of the Soviet Union" twice removed from high positions for political reasons, Zhukov's career reflects the tenuous position of the professional military officer in the Soviet system.

emphasized mobility, flanking maneuvers, and flexibility of command at all levels.

In reality, there appeared a gaping chasm between doctrine and practice. Throughout most of the interwar years, the instrument was unequal to the requirements being placed upon it. Reflecting the abysmal educational level of Russian society, the Army was conceptually and technologically unable to conduct the type of operations that doctrine demanded of it. Moreover, the rigid control that characterized Stalinist Russia pervaded the Army. In the maneuver of 1936, observers noted that the forces tended to rely on frontal assaults conducted according to rigid and highly detailed plans, with little effort at coordination between branches.²⁸

Nevertheless, by the mid-1930s the Red Army was becoming a formidable machine—even though not yet well-oiled. A major factor in this growing competency was the arrangement signed in 1922 between the two outcasts of Europe, Bolshevik Russia and defeated Germany. Ostensibly a diplomatic

and economic agreement, the Treaty of Rapallo contained secret provisions for extensive military collaboration. The Soviet Union provided facilities to the German Army to produce, experiment on, and train with aircraft, tanks, and other weapons. In return, Germany agreed to share the results of these experiments, to assist in the development of Soviet military production, and to exchange students at their military schools. For several years, senior officials of both armies observed the annual maneuvers of their secret ally. The arrangement, which lasted until the Nazis came to power, proved beneficial to both sides. The future *Wehrmacht* was able to develop ideas on the employment of weapons denied them by the Versailles Treaty, while the Red Army acquired important guidance on the production of military equipment, on training methods, and on the employment of technical weapons, particularly tanks and aircraft. In its relationship to the state, the Red Army fared rather well during the political and social

turmoil of the 1920s.²⁹ Joseph Stalin did name General Voroshilov, his compatriot from the civil war days, commissar for defense when he took over the party and government in 1925, and the security and political indoctrination apparatus remained outside the military chain of command. Nevertheless, the Army for several years remained surprisingly free of the upheaval that began with the collectivization of the peasants and continued into the 1930s. The doctrinal debate continued in a relatively open intellectual environment. Although the dual command system remained on paper, military commanders dominated political commissars. Officer ranks, abolished during the civil war, were restored, and five individuals received the new rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. The Army gained social status, and none but junior officers fell under the civil judiciary system. In part, this state of affairs reflected the increasing communization of the military. By 1934, about half of the rank and file were Party members, and 67 percent of the officers were at least nominal communists.³⁰ But a bigger motive behind the freedom Stalin gave the military was his reliance on the Army to enforce the first Five Year Plan and the collectivization of agriculture, both of which met stiff resistance.

In 1937, however, Stalin suddenly unleashed the full fury of his power on the Red Army. In a massive bloodletting between the spring of 1937 and the fall of 1938 the former political commissar literally wiped out the high command.[iii] The extent of the purges was staggering: three of the five Marshals of the Soviet Union, all eleven deputy commissars for defense; 75 of 80 corps commanders and 110 of 195 division commanders. Numerically, the losses at

colonel and below were even greater, although many of these individuals were not killed and would reappear after June 1941. Altogether, the purge of 1937-1938 affected between a quarter and a half of the officer corps of the Red Army. By the end of 1938, only 39 percent of the officers at division level and above still held their positions.³¹

Although the upheaval provided the opportunity for some excellent officers to move into command positions, almost to a man those chosen for the high command were at best mediocre and often incompetent. By replacing many of the best senior ranking officers with those whose primary qualification was political reliability, Stalin demonstrated conclusively that "the basic factor in Soviet military organization and the choice of men to run it was decisively political."³² Inevitably, the purge impacted upon the doctrine and organization of the Red Army. Just before his fall, Marshal Tukhachevsky had begun to place greater emphasis on mechanized forces and to develop a "cutting edge" equipped with modern weapons and vehicles to operate independently of the mass infantry army. The new leadership, reading the wrong lessons from the limited experience provided by the Spanish Civil War, reversed this trend and subordinated more completely armor to infantry. Similarly, developments in strategic bombing doctrine and capabilities were halted, and attention focused on a limited ground support role for the Soviet air force. At a critical time, the development of the Red Army was brought to a standstill by the turnover in leadership and by retarded doctrine.

The high command would learn from the German blitz of Poland and their own experiences against the Japanese in 1939 and the Finns in the Winter War of 1940-41. The

[iii] Stalin's motives for this action remain a matter of historical speculation; the most plausible explanation is that he wanted to guarantee the utter reliability of the armed forces and felt he could do so only by eliminating all those who had remained "independent" of him in their rise within the Red Army.

German invasion of Russia in the summer of 1941, however, would catch the Soviets at the worst possible moment — in the midst of yet another doctrinal shift. Despite the fertile intellectual debates of the 1920s, and

the rapid progress the backward Red Army had made in the first fifteen years after the civil war, the Soviet Union would pay a high price for emphasizing political reliability over professional expertise.

RECOMMENDED READING

Marc Bloch, *Strange Defeat*

Otto Chaney, *Zhukov*

Joachim Fest, *Hitler* (pb)

J.F.C. Fuller, *Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier*

Albert Seaton, *Stalin as Military Commander*

C.P. Snow, *Science and Government*

FOOTNOTES

¹ For an excellent discussion of the convolutions in French military theory see Richard D. Challener, *The French Theory of the Nation in Arms, 1866-1939* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), especially for this period, Chapters 4-6.

² General Maurin, cited in Paul-Marie de la Gorce, *The French Army: A Military-Political History*, trans. by Kenneth Douglas (New York: George Braziller, 1963), p. 273.

³ Colonel Julien Brosse, cited in Challener, *French Theory*, p. 144.

⁴ General d'Armeé Beaufre, "Liddell Hart and the French Army, 1919-1939," in Michael Howard, ed., *The Theory and Practice of War* (London: Cassell, 1965) pp. 141, 140.

⁵ Charles Messinger, *The Blitzkrieg Story* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), p. 60.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

⁷ The best picture of the intellectual slow footedness of the French high command is Marc Bloch, *Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940*, trans. by Gerard Hopkins (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), especially pp. 1-125.

⁸ De la Gorce, *French Army*, p. 277.

⁹ Correlli Barnett, *Britain and Her Army, 1509-1970: A Military, Political, and Social Survey*

(New York: William Morrow & Company, 1970), p. 410-12.

¹⁰ Norman Gibbs, "British Strategic Doctrine, 1918-1939," in Michael Howard, *Theory and Practice*, p. 209

¹¹ Messenger, *Blitzkrieg Story*, pp. 83-84.

¹² Cited in *ibid*, p. 79.

¹³ Cited in *ibid*, p. 46.

¹⁴ Cited in *ibid*, p. 81

¹⁵ Robin Higham, *Armed Forces in Perspective: Britain, 1918-1940, a Case Study* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1962), p. 99.

¹⁶ Barnett, *Britain and Her Army*, p. 423.

¹⁷ An excellent brief study of Seeckt can be found in B.H. Liddell Hart, *The German Generals Talk* (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1948), pp. 10-19.

¹⁸ Cited in *ibid.*, p. 16.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

²⁰ Captain Robert J. O'Neill, "Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1919-1939," in Michael Howard, *Theory and Practice*, p. 146.

²¹ The most balanced account of the relationship between Hitler and the army is Robert J. O'Neill. *The German Army and the Nazi Party. 1933-1939* (London: Cassell & Company. LTD, 1966). See also Gordon Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army. 1640-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

²² John Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics, 1918-1945* (Macmillan, 1964), p.x.

²³ Herbert Rosinski, *The German Army*.

²⁴ O'Neill, "Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1919-1939," in Michael Howard, *Theory and Practice*, pp. 145-165.

²⁵ Each of these issues is discussed in great detail in John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918-1941* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962), Chapters 5-8, and more briefly in J.M. MacKintosh, "The Development of Soviet Military Doctrine since 1918," in Michael Howard, *Theory and Practice*, pp. 249-258.

²⁶ Messinger, *Blitzkrieg Story*, p. 94.

²⁷ Erickson, *The Soviet High Command*, pp. 351, 390.

²⁸ Mackintosh, "Soviet Military Doctrine," in Michael Howard, *Theory and Practice*, p. 255

²⁹ In addition to Erickson, see J.M. Mackintosh, "The Red Army, 1920-36," in B.H. Liddell Hart, ed., *The Red Army* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956).

³⁰ Erickson, *Soviet High Command*, p. 374.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 505-06

³² *Ibid.*, p. 143.